PassZit

Security

A password manager holds the keys to everything else, so it must not become the weakest point. Here is how PassZit is built, tested and released — and how to tell us about a problem.

Report a vulnerability

Please report security problems privately, not in a public issue: open the Security tab of the repository and click Report a vulnerability, with the affected version and how to reproduce it. We confirm reports within a few working days, fix confirmed problems in a new release and credit the reporter in the release notes unless they prefer otherwise.

Security fixes are released for the newest version. Machine-readable contact: security.txt.

How PassZit protects your passwords

End-to-end encryption

The browser, the extension or the command line derives the keys from the master password with Argon2id (64 MiB, 3 passes) and encrypts every item — name, user name, password, websites, notes, files — with AES-256-GCM. The server stores only ciphertext and an argon2id hash of a separate authentication key; it never receives the master password or a key it could use.

Sharing

A shared vault has its own key, sealed to the X25519 public key of every member. Because the server hands out the public keys, PassZit shows their fingerprints, remembers the confirmed ones and warns when one changes; when someone leaves, the vault gets a new key.

Sign-in and console

Accounts only by invitation, mandatory two-factor sign-in, blocking after failed sign-ins, an allow-list of networks, CSRF protection, a strict Content-Security-Policy without inline scripts, optional four-eyes approval and a hash-chained audit log.

Browser extension

The extension brings its own code, which the server cannot change. It fills only on the site a login belongs to and only in the top page, shows its offers in its own window and keeps unlocked keys in memory, never on disk.

Honest limit, also in the built-in guide: the web vault's JavaScript comes from your server, so someone who fully controls the server could serve changed code. Protect the server like any critical system and use the browser extension for everyday work.

How releases are protected

How PassZit is tested

On every change (GitHub Actions)

CheckWhat it finds
CIgofmt, go vet and the full test suite against an embedded PostgreSQL, with the web vault's crypto, the importers and both browser extensions running in a real Chrome; Linux and Windows builds; Gitleaks
Race detectorThe whole test suite again with -race: data races in the server and the command line
FuzzingEvery parser of untrusted input (passkey and WebAuthn data, messages of the MaxZit Launcher, sealed vault data and recovery keys, backup files, SSO state and SAML, uploaded certificates, the requests of the web vault, the extension and the command line, QR pictures); in the browser, imported files are mutated thousands of times and encrypted exports damaged
gosec (Linux, Windows)Insecure Go patterns: command execution, file permissions, weak cryptography; every accepted finding carries a written reason in the code
CodeQLInjection, path traversal, unsafe redirects and other data-flow bugs (Go, JavaScript, workflows)
govulncheckKnown vulnerabilities in Go and in the dependencies the code actually calls
staticcheck (Linux, Windows)Bugs and dead code
DependabotVulnerable or outdated Go modules and actions
Secret scanningCredentials committed by mistake (with push protection)
OpenSSF ScorecardSupply-chain practices of the repository

The release branch accepts only commits that pass the build, tests, race detector, fuzzing, gosec, staticcheck and govulncheck.

Before every release (in a test lab, on the exact release candidate)

CheckWhat it finds
SemgrepInjection, XSS, insecure cookies, open redirects (Go, JavaScript, secrets, OWASP Top 10 rules)
TrivyVulnerable dependencies, secrets and misconfigurations
GitleaksSecrets in the whole git history
OWASP ZAPFull scan signed in as an administrator: XSS, SQL injection, CSRF, path traversal, header problems
Role probesA crawl of every page as administrator and as user in English and Serbian; every administrator route must refuse users, and every route requests without a session
Appliance imageTrivy over the operating-system packages, a Lynis hardening audit, testssl.sh on the console port and Nuclei: outdated packages, weak OS settings, TLS problems, known exposures
OpenVAS and nmapNetwork-level vulnerabilities, open ports and TLS settings of the appliance; run when the network side of the appliance changes
End-to-end QABoth browser extensions in real Chrome and Firefox; code reviews of the server's rights, the web vault's crypto and the extension; the appliance images imported on Proxmox, VMware ESXi and Hyper-V

Findings are fixed before the release; accepted risks are documented in the release notes.

This website

passzit.com is a static site: only a language cookie, no analytics, no trackers, no third-party scripts or fonts, and a Content-Security-Policy that allows no scripts at all. See the privacy policy.